Operation Seelöwe

Directive No. 16

Concerning preparations for an amphibious operation against England.

Since Britain still shows no sign of willingness to come to an agreement in spite of her hopeless military situation, I have decided to prepare and if necessary carry out an amphibious operation against England.

The purpose of this operation will be to eliminate the English mother country as a base for continuation of the war against Germany and, if it should become necessary, to occupy the entire island.

To this end I order as follows:

1. The amphibious operation must be carried out as a surprise crossing on a broad front extending approximately from Ramsgate to the region of the Isle of Wight, with Luftwaffe elements assuming the role of artillery, and naval units assuming the role of engineers. 
   
   Each individual branch of the Wehrmacht will examine from its own viewpoint whether it appears practicable to carry out subsidiary operations, for example to occupy the Isle of Wight or Cornwall County, prior to the general crossing, and will report its findings to me. I reserve the decision to myself.
   
   Preparations for the overall operations must be completed by mid-August.
    
2. These preparations will include the creation of conditions which will make a landing in England possible:
   
   1. The English air force must be so far neutralized, both actually and in morale, that it will offer no appreciable resistance to the German crossing operation;
   2. Lanes must be cleared of mines;
   3. Both outlets of the Straits of Dover, and the west entrance to the English Channel in a line approximately from Alderney to Portland, must be sealed off by a dense belt of mines;
   4. The coastal areas must be commanded and covered by the fire of heavy coastal artillery;
   5. It is desirable that all British naval forces should be tied down in action, both in the North Sea and in the Mediterranean - here by the Italians - shortly before the crossing; efforts must be made now already by means of air and torpedo attacks to weaken as far as possible the British naval forces presently in those waters.
      
    
3. Organization of Command and Preparations. Under my command and in accordance with my general directives the commanders in chief of the three branches of the Wehrmacht will direct the operations of their forces employed in the operation. From 1 August on, the operations staffs of the commanders in chief of the Army, the Navy, and the Luftwaffe must be within the area with a maximum radius of 30 miles from my headquarters at Ziegenberg. To me it appears advisable for the most vital elements of the operations staffs of the commanders in chief of the Army and the Navy to occupy mutual premises in Giessen. The commander in chief of the Army will thus have to establish an army group headquarters to conduct the operations of the landing armies.
   
   The operation will be given the designation Sealion (Seelöwe).
   
   During preparations and in the execution of the operation the missions of the three branches of the Wehrmacht will be as follows:
    
   1. Army. Preparation of plans of operations and of a crossing plan initially for all units to be shipped in the first wave. The units accompanying the first wave will remain under Army control (under the individual landing groupments) until it is possible to subdivide their mission into responsibility for (1) support and protection for the ground forces, (2) protection of the ports of debarkation, and (3) protection for the air bases to be occupied.
       
      The Army will also allocate shipping space to the individual landing groupments and will define the points of embarkation and debarkation in agreement with the Navy.
       
   2. Navy. Procurement and assembly of the required shipping space at the points of embarkation designated by the Army and in accordance with nautical requirements. As far as possible use will be made of ships from defeated hostile countries.
       
      The necessary naval advisory staff, escort ships, and other protective naval units will be provided by the Navy at each crossing area.
       
      In addition to the protection afforded by the air units employed, naval forces will protect the flanks of the entire movement across the Channel. Orders will be issued regulating the chain of command during the actual crossing.
       
      Another mission of the Navy is to direct the uniform disposition of coastal artillery, namely, of all naval and Army batteries which can be used against naval targets and to generally organize the control of fire.
       
      The largest possible number of the heaviest artillery units will be so placed that they can be brought into effective action as speedily as possible to protect the flanks of the movements against hostile naval attack. For this purpose all railway artillery, reinforced by all available captured guns but minus the K-5 and K-12 batteries earmarked for counter-battery fire against shore-based hostile artillery in England, will be withdrawn from present positions and emplaced on railway turntable mounts.
       
      In addition to the above, all platform guns of the heaviest types will be so emplaced under concrete protection opposite the Straits of Dover that they will be proof against even the heaviest air attacks. They will be so sited that they will command the Straits under all circumstances as far as their ranges permit.
       
      The technical work involved will be carried out by Organization Todt.
       
   3. Luftwaffe. The mission of the Luftwaffe will be to prevent interference by hostile air forces. In addition airpower will be employed to neutralize coastal fortifications which could deliver fire in the landing areas, to break the initial resistance offered by the hostile ground forces, and to destroy reserves during their forward movement. These missions will require extremely close contact between the individual air units and the landing forces of the Army.
       
      It will also be important for air units to destroy roads which could be used by the enemy to move reserves forward, and to attack naval units approaching the areas of operations while still far distant from the crossing routes.
       
      I request recommendations on the use of paratrooper and glider and other airborne forces. The question must be examined together with the Army whether it would be wise to withhold paratroop and other airborne forces during the initial stages as a reserve force which could be moved quickly to critical areas in the event of an emergency..
       
4. The Wehrmacht chief signal officer will ensure that all necessary preparations are made to establish communications between France and England. Preparations will be made in cooperation with the Navy to lay what is still available of the 48 miles of marine cable taken up from the East Prussian canal.
    
5. I request the commanders in chief to submit to me as early as possible:
   1. The measures planned by the Navy and the Luftwaffe to create the conditions necessary for the Channel crossing operation (Item 2, above);
   2. Details on the disposition of the coastal artillery batteries (Navy);
   3. A survey of the shipping to be employed and of the methods of concentration and equipment. All civilian agencies participate? (Navy);
   4. Plans for the organization of air defence in the areas of concentration for troops and for equipment to be used in the crossing operation (Luftwaffe);
   5. Channel-crossing schedule and plan of operations of the Army, and organization and equipment of the first attack wave;
   6. Organization and action planned by the Navy and the Luftwaffe for the defence of the crossing movement itself, for reconnaissance, and for support during the landing;
   7. Recommendations concerning the commitment of paratrooper and other airborne forces and concerning the command of forces after an adequately large area has been brought under control in England (Luftwaffe);
   8. Recommendations for the location of headquarters for the command echelons of the commander in chief of the Army and the commander in chief of the Navy;
   9. Comments by the Army, the Navy, and the Luftwaffe as to whether and what partial operations are considered practicable prior to the general amphibious operation;
   10. Recommendations by, the Army and the Navy concerning the chain of command during the crossing, while seaborne.

J[odl]
K[eitel] 
Adolf Hitler